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Abstract
Weisberg (2009) introduces a phenomenon he terms perceptual under-
mining. He argues that it poses a problem for Jeffrey conditionalization
(Jeffrey 1983), and Bayesian epistemology in general. This is Weisberg’s
paradox. Weisberg (2014) argues that perceptual undermining also poses a
problem for ranking theory (Spohn 2012) and for Dempster-Shafer theory
(Shafer 1976). In this paper I argue that perceptual undermining does not
pose a problem for any of these theories: for true conditionalizers Weis-
berg’s paradox is a false alarm.
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1 Weisberg’s Paradox
Weisberg’s paradox consists in the inconsistency of four seemingly plausible con-
straints. It arises from the following example. Let D be the proposition that the
sock really is red, and let F be the hypothesis that the lighting makes all socks
look red. At time t0 Sophia does not believe that the sock really is red and has a
low degree of belief in D. Between t0 and time t1 she has a visual experience by
looking at the sock. This visual experience between t0 and t1 causes her, among
other things, to form the belief that the sock really is red at t1; it leads to an in-
crease in her degree of belief in D at t1. At time t2 she becomes certain that the
lighting makes all socks look red; she assigns a maximal degree of belief to F at
t2. Since F is supposed to undermine the visual experience she has had between t0
and t1, this should make her drop her newly acquired belief that the sock really is
red at t2 again, and lower her degree of belief in D at t2 back to what it was at t0.
In a probabilistic setting this story is claimed to give rise to the following three
constraints:
0. At time t0 Sophia’s degree of belief in D is low, say Pr0 (D) = .1.
1a. At time t1 Sophia’s degree of belief in D is high, say Pr1 (D) = .9.
2. At time t2 Sophia’s degree of belief inD is low again, Pr2 (D) = Pr1 (D | F) =
Pr0 (D) = .1.
Sophia’s degree of belief function at time t2, Pr2, comes from her degree of be-
lief function at time t1, Pr1, by an application of strict conditionalization to the
hypothesis F. Strict conditionalization is the following update rule:
Update Rule 1 (Strict Conditionalization) If Pr0 (·) : A → R is the ideal dox-
astic agent’s probability measure at time t0, and between t0 and t1 she becomes
certain of the proposition E ∈ A, Pr0 (E) > 0, in the sense that Pr1 (E) = 1, and
she does not become certain of any logically stronger proposition (and her proba-
bilities are not directly affected in any other way such as forgetting etc.), then her
probability measure at time t1 should be Pr1 (·) : A→ R,
Pr 1 (·) = Pr E (·) = Pr 0 (· | E) = Pr 0 (· ∩ E) /Pr 0 (E) .
It is important to note that E is assumed to be the total evidence the ideal doxastic
agent receives between time t0 and time t1.
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Sophia’s degree of belief function at time t1, Pr1, is assumed to come from her
degree of belief function at time t0, Pr0, by an application of Jeffrey conditional-
ization to the evidential partition
{
D,D
}
with input parameters Pr1 (D) = .9 and
Pr1
(
D
)
= .1. This assumption will turn out to be crucial. Hence it is stated as an
independent constraint:
1b. Sophia’s degree of belief function at time t1, Pr1, comes from her degree of
belief function at time t0, Pr0, by an application of Jeffrey conditionalization
to the evidential partition
{
D,D
}
with input parameters Pr1 (D) = .9 and
Pr1
(
D
)
= .1.
Jeffrey conditionalization is the following update rule:
Update Rule 2 (Jeffrey Conditionalization, Jeffrey 1983) If Pr0 (·) : A → R
is the ideal doxastic agent’s probability measure at time t0, and between t0 and
t1 her probabilities on the evidential partition {Ei ∈ A : i ∈ I} directly change to
pi ∈ R, where ∑i∈I pi = 1, and pi = 0 if Pr (Ei) = 0, and her positive probabilities
do not directly change on any finer partition (and her probabilities are not directly
affected in any other way such as forgetting etc.), then her probability measure at
time t1 should be Pr1 (·) : A→ R,
Pr 1 (·) = Pr Ei→pi (·) =
∑
i∈I Pr 0 (· | Ei) · pi.
It is important to note that the evidential partition {Ei ∈ A : i ∈ I} and the input
parameters pi ∈ R are assumed to be a complete description of all doxastically
relevant events that happen between t0 and t1. In our example it is important to
note that constraint (1b) amounts to the assumption that the only doxastically rel-
evant effect of the visual experience between t0 and t1 is that Sophia’s degrees
of belief in D and D change to Pr1 (D) = .9 and Pr1
(
D
)
= .1. In particular, it
follows from constraint (1b) that F is not directly affected, in any doxastically rel-
evant way, by Sophia’s visual experience between t0 and t1. Among other things,
this means that, at t1, Sophia does not also form a belief about how she came to
be more confident in D (or, if she has a belief at t1 about how she came to be
more confident in D, then it is the same belief that she had at t0, before she had
the visual experience). In order to simplify matters, let us assume, as is reason-
able, that, at t0, Sophia has no particular belief about what will happen between
t0 and t1. Then constraint (1b) implies that, at t1, Sophia remains agnostic as to
whether it was by vision, or by some other form of perception, or by testimony, or
by clairvoyance that she became more confident in D.
4
In other words, unless she already does so at t0, Sophia does not believe at t1
that the experience she undergoes between t0 and t1 is a visual experience. For all
she believes at t1, the experience she undergoes between t0 and t1 may not even
be a perceptual experience. Indeed, given our reasonable assumption, for all she
believes at t1, what happens between t0 and t1 may not even be an experience of
hers. We know this from the way the story was told, but, according to constraint
(1b), she does not.1
So far, so good. Now the allegedly bad news. Jeffrey conditionalization is
rigid. This implies that Jeffrey conditionalization preserves probabilistic indepen-
dence of the members of the evidential partition. If a proposition A is independent
of the evidential proposition D according to Sophia’s degree of belief function at
time t0, Pr0 (A | D) = Pr0 (A), then A is also independent of D according to her
degree of belief function at a time t1, Pr1 (A | D) = Pr1 (A).
Weisberg (2009; 2014) thinks that this poses a problem for Jeffrey condition-
alization, and Bayesian epistemology in general. He does so, because there is the
following fourth constraint:
3. F is independent of D according to Sophia’s degree of belief function at
time t0, Pr0 (F | D) = Pr0 (F).
Weisberg (2009; 2014) is, of course, free to stipulate any constraints he wants.
However, in order to evaluate the joint plausibility of his constraints, we need to
understand what this condition says, and what it does not say. The condition says:
at t0, the degree to which Sophia believes that the lighting makes all socks look
red has no bearing on the degree to which she believes that the sock really is red.
The condition does not say: at t0, whether or not the lighting makes all socks look
red has no bearing on whether or not the sock really is red.
Together with the rigidity of Jeffrey conditionalization this fourth constraint
implies that F is independent of D according to Sophia’s degree of belief func-
tion at time t1, Pr1 (F | D) = Pr1 (F). However, if F is independent of D ac-
cording to Sophia’s degree of belief function at time t1, Pr1 (F | D) = Pr1 (F),
then D is independent of F according to her degree of belief function at time t1,
Pr1 (D | F) = Pr1 (D). In this case her degree of belief in D at time t2 equals her
degree of belief in D at time t1, Pr2 (D) = Pr1 (D) = .9. This contradicts the third
constraint according to which Pr2 (D) = .1.
1If, contrary to what constraint (1b) implies, Sophia had even the slightest of hunches about
what might have caused the changes in her degrees of belief in D and in D, the evidential partition
would include other propositions besides D and D. In this case Weisberg’s paradox would not
arise.
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Weisberg’s paradox consists in this inconsistency. In the next section I will
defend Jeffrey conditionalization and argue that Weisberg’s paradox is resolved
once we notice the implications of constraints (0-1) and (3) – in particular, (1b) –
which make constraint (2) utterly implausible.
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2 Jeffrey Conditionalization Defended
Weisberg’s paradox consists in the inconsistency of the four seemingly plausible
constraints (0-3), where Jeffrey conditionalization is part of constraint (1). For
Weisberg (2009; 2014) the culprit is constraint (1) with Jeffrey conditionalization.
I want to defend Jeffrey conditionalization.
Constraints (0-1) imply that what Sophia has experienced between t0 and t1
when looking at the sock results in an increase in her degree of belief in the propo-
sition D that the sock really is red: Pr1 (D) > Pr0 (D). However, in conjunction
with the allegedly plausible constraint (3) constraints (0-1) also imply that what
Sophia has experienced between t0 and t1 makes her hold onto her degree of belief
in the hypothesis F that the lighting makes all socks look red: Pr1 (F) = Pr0 (F). I
want to use this consequence of constraints (0-1) and (3) to motivate my defense
of Jeffrey conditionalization.
Roughly speaking, the former inequality Pr1 (D) > Pr0 (D) says that at t1
Sophia thinks that what she has experienced between t0 and t1 – or better, as
Sophia may not even believe that it was an experience: what has happened be-
tween t0 and t1 – is related to D. The difference between Pr1 (D) and Pr0 (D), in
whichever way it is measured, reflects how likely she thinks, at t1, that what has
happened between t0 and t1 is related to D. The latter equation Pr1 (F) = Pr0 (F)
says, roughly, that at t1 she thinks that what has happened between t0 and t1 has
nothing to do with F. The difference between Pr1 (F) and Pr0 (F), in whichever
way it is measured, is nil, and that is how likely she thinks it, at t1, that what has
happened between t0 and t1 is related to F. In particular, this latter equation says,
roughly, that, at t1, Sophia thinks that F is not a potential underminer for what has
happened between t0 and t1.
Less roughly speaking, on the one hand constraints (0-1) say that Sophia’s
belief in D is directly affected by what happens between t0 and t1 in such a way
that she ends up being more confident in D at t1 than she was at t0. On the
other hand constraints (0-1) say that Sophia’s belief in F is not directly affected
by what happens between t0 and t1. Constraints (0-1) and the allegedly plausible
stipulation (3) add to this that Sophia’s belief in F is not indirectly affected by
what happens between t0 and t1 either. Together constraints (0-1) and (3) thus say
that Sophia’s belief in F is neither directly nor indirectly affected by what happens
between t0 and t1. In particular, constraints (0-1) and (3) say that, at t1, Sophia
thinks that F is not a potential underminer for what has happened between t0 and
t1.2
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In other words, constraints (0-1) and (3) imply that at t1 Sophia thinks that
what has happened between t0 and t1 may be due the fact that the sock really is
red, D, but is definitely not due to the fact that the lighting makes all socks look
red, F. Given this consequence of constraints (0-1) and (3), constraint (2) clearly
should be rejected: constraint (2) says that, at t1, Sophia thinks that F is a potential
underminer for what has happened between t0 and t1, whereas it follows from
constraints (0-1) and (3) that, at t1, she thinks that F is not a potential underminer
for what has happened between t0 and t1.
Here is a different way of putting things. Suppose we modeled the change of
Sophia’s degree of belief function from t0 to t1 by an application of strict con-
ditionalization to the appearance proposition D∗ that the sock appears to be red,
Pr1 (·) = Pr0 (· | D∗). In this case Sophia would believe that the actual color of
the sock is relevant to the apparent color of the sock, Pr1 (D) = Pr0 (D | D∗) >
Pr0 (D). More importantly, however, she would presumably also believe that the
apparent color of the sock is relevant to the hypothesis that the lighting makes all
socks look red, Pr1 (F) = Pr0 (F | D∗) > Pr0 (F). Consequently we would not have
the consequence Pr1 (F) = Pr0 (F | D∗) = Pr0 (F).
Now in Weisberg’s example there is no appearance proposition D∗ that Sophia
becomes certain of between t0 and t1. Instead of an application of strict condi-
tionalization to the appearance proposition D∗ we have an application of Jeffrey
conditionalization to the evidential partition
{
D,D
}
that is caused by some vi-
sual experience d∗. Instead of the appearance proposition D∗ that Sophia becomes
certain of, the doxastically relevant effects of the visual experience d∗ are now
described more indirectly: they correspond to the differences between Sophia’s
degrees of belief in D and D at t0 and her degrees of belief in D and D at t1. The
visual experience d∗ is non-propositional evidence that is reflected in the different
shapes of Sophia’s two degree of belief functions at t0 and at t1 on the evidential
partition
{
D,D
}
. Most importantly, in contrast to the above case where Sophia
becomes certain of an appearance proposition, and thus learns something about
what drives the change in her degrees of belief, constraint (1b) excludes informa-
2The conjunction of constraints (0-1) and (3) is logically strictly stronger than its consequence
Pr0 (F) = Pr1 (F). The latter equation can be true if constraints (0-1) or (3) are false, because the
various effects on Sophia’s belief in F may “cancel out.” For instance, what happens between t0
and t1 may affect Sophia’s belief in the four propositions X ∩ F,X ∩ F,X ∩ F,X ∩ F, for some
proposition X, even though Sophia’s degrees of belief in X ∩ F and X ∩ F may sum to the same
number at t0 and at t1. It is the conjunction of constraints (0-1) and (3), not its consequence, that
says that, at t1, Sophia thinks that F is not a potential underminer for what has happened between
t0 and t1.
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tion about what drives the change in Sophia’s degrees of belief in D and D. For
all Sophia believes, the change in her degrees of belief in D and D may be due to
a lapse of rationality.
Given these consequences it becomes clear that, in the presence of constraints
(0-1) and (3) – in particular, constraint (1b) – constraint (2) is utterly implausible.
If Sophia does not believe that the change in her degrees of belief in D and D
between t0 and t1 has been caused by her vision, why should she believe that F
can undo this doxastically relevant effect of what has happened between t0 an t1?
The way the story is told makes it clear to us that it was her vision that caused
her increase in confidence in D. However, as long as this information is not also
made available to her3, there is no reason whatsoever to assume that her becoming
certain of F should have any effect at all on her degree of belief in D.
To be sure, there are potential underminers F for Sophia’s visual experience
that takes place between t0 and t1, and constraint (2) can be satisfied. However,
if constraint (2) is satisfied for some potential underminer F, then this poten-
tial underminer F must violate constraint (3) or constraint (1). Constraint (3)
is violated by F if F is not independent of D according to Pr0. Constraint (1)
is violated by F if Jeffrey conditionalization is applied to an evidential parti-
tion {Ei : i ∈ I} whose members are not all logically independent of the poten-
tial underminer F, and which must thus be more fine-grained than
{
D,D
}
, say,{
D ∩ F,D ∩ F,D ∩ F,D ∩ F
}
.
If constraint (3) is violated by F, but constraint (1) holds, then F is indirectly
affected by the visual experience that takes place between t0 and t1, and Jeffrey
conditionalization governs this indirect way of being affected. In this case F fig-
ures in the output of Jeffrey conditionalization, which tells Sophia, among other
things, what to believe about F. If constraint (1) is violated by F, then F is directly
affected by the visual experience that takes place between t0 and t1, and Jeffrey
conditionalization has to be applied to an evidential partition some of whose mem-
bers are logically dependent on F. In this case F figures in the input of Jeffrey con-
ditionalization, and Sophia has to specify her new degrees of belief for all these
members, including those that logically depend on F, before Jeffrey conditional-
ization can be applied.
3One way of making this information available to Sophia is by using Shafer (1985)’s notion of
a protocol. Halpern (2003: ch. 6) uses protocols to solve Freund (1965)’s puzzle. Spohn (2012:
sct. 9.3) uses protocols to solve the puzzle of the three prisoners (Mosteller 1965: problem 13)
that is also known as the Monty Hall problem. Halpern (ms) uses protocols to solve the Doomsday
Argument and the Sleeping Beauty Problem. A different proposal is discussed in the Appendix.
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Either way there is no problem for Jeffrey conditionalization. We just have
to realize that, while a change of Sophia’s degrees of belief from t0 to t1 can
be undermined, it can only be undermined by a hypothesis F that is doxastically
affected by what drives the former change. This can happen indirectly by F not
being probabilistically independent of the members of the evidential partition and
thus violating the allegedly plausible stipulation (3). Or it can happen directly
by F not being logically independent of all members of the evidential partition to
which Jeffrey conditionalization is applied. Which is determined by experience,
not by methodology.
For these reasons I conclude that Weisberg’s paradox may affect the applica-
bility of Jeffrey conditionalization, but not its validity. Weisberg’s paradox does
not undermine Jeffrey’s rule of conditionalization: for true conditionalizers Weis-
berg’s paradox is a false alarm. Parallel considerations show that perceptual un-
dermining does not pose a problem for ranking theory or Dempster-Shafer theory
either.
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3 Appendix
One way of making the information that it was her vision that caused her increase
in confidence in D available to Sophia is by using Shafer (1985)’s notion of a
protocol. Protocols have proved to be a powerful tool in solving paradoxes. For
instance, Halpern (2003: ch. 6) uses protocols to solve Freund (1965)’s puzzle.
Spohn (2012: sct. 9.3) uses protocols to solve the puzzle of the three prison-
ers (Mosteller 1965: problem 13) that is also known as the Monty Hall problem.
Halpern (ms) uses protocols to solve the Doomsday Argument and the Sleeping
Beauty Problem. It is only natural that protocols can also be used to solve Weis-
berg’s Paradox.
A different proposal for making the information that it was Sophia’s vision
that caused her increase in confidence in D available to Sophia is presented in
Gallow (2014). Gallow (2014) first proposes the following update rule:
Update Rule 3 (Gallow Conditionalization I, Gallow 2014) If Pr0 (·) : A →
R is the ideal doxastic agent’s probability measure at time t0, and between t0 and
t1 she receives total evidence of the form {(Ti,Ei) : i ∈ I}, where the Ti ∈ A form
a partition of the underlying set of possible worlds W, and her probabilities are
not directly affected in any other way such as forgetting etc., then her probability
measure at time t1 should be Pr1 (·) : A→ R,
Pr 1 (·) =
∑
i∈I Pr 0 (· | Ti ∩ Ei) · Pr 0 (Ti) .
The interpretation of a pair (Ti,Ei) is that the ideal doxastic agent’s evidence is Ei,
provided Ti is the case. For instance, Sophia’s total evidence may be that the sock
really is red, provided the lighting does not make all socks look red and everything
else is normal as well; and nothing otherwise: {(N,E) , (¬N,W)}.
Gallow conditionalization I is an instance of Jeffrey conditionalization on the
evidential partition
{
Ti ∩ Ei,Ti ∩ Ei : i ∈ I
}
with input parameters Pr1 (Ti ∩ Ei) =
Pr0 (Ti) and Pr1
(
Ti ∩ Ei
)
= 0. Unfortunately it does not allow the ideal doxastic
agent to ever change her confidence in any of the theories Ti, i.e. Pr 1 (Ti) =
Pr 0 (Ti).
For this reason Gallow (2014) generalizes his first update rule to the following
second update rule:
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Update Rule 4 (Gallow Conditionalization II, Gallow 2014) If Pr0 (·) : A →
R is the ideal doxastic agent’s probability measure at time t0, and between t0 and
t1 she receives total evidence of the form {(Ti,Ei) : i ∈ I}, where the Ti ∈ A form
a partition of the underlying set of possible worlds W, and her probabilities are
not directly affected in any other way such as forgetting etc., then her probability
measure at time t1 should be Pr1 (·) : A→ R,
Pr 1 (·) =
∑
i∈I Pr 0 (· | Ti ∩ Ei) · Pr 0 (Ti) · ∆i,
where ∆i is a non-negative real number representing the degree to which the total
evidence {(Ti,Ei) : i ∈ I} (dis)confirms theory Ti.
Contrary to what Gallow (2014: 21) claims his second update rule does not gen-
eralize Jeffrey conditionalization. Indeed, quite the opposite is the case. Gallow
conditionalization II is also just an instance of Jeffrey conditionaliaztion on the
evidential partition
{
Ti ∩ Ei,Ti ∩ Ei : i ∈ I
}
with input parameters Pr1 (Ti ∩ Ei) =
Pr0 (Ti) · ∆i and Pr1
(
Ti ∩ Ei
)
= 0. (As Gallow (2014: 25ff) shows, the sum∑
i∈I Pr 0 (Ti) ·∆i =
∑
i∈I Pr1 (Ti ∩ Ei) =
∑
i∈I
(
Pr1 (Ti ∩ Ei) + Pr 1
(
Ti ∩ Ei
))
equals
1, and so the constraints of Jeffrey conditionalization are satisfied.)
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